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Abstract 
This paper brings new evidence on the relationship between employees' well being, sickness absence and four 
dimensions of workplace performance i.e. productivity, efficiency, quality of service and profitability. It uses a 
new panel dataset with monthly observations over two years for 48 local units of a large multi-site organisation 
in the logistics sector. It finds that good consultation and communication at the local level are associated with 
lower absenteeism. It also finds that lower absence is associated with higher efficiency, productivity, quality of 
the service and profitability of the firm. Finally, the authors suggest that the link between workers’ absence and 
this firm’s profitability runs through the increased use of replacement labour which raises short-run costs and 
reduces quality of service. 
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1. Introduction 
Absence from work due to sickness is widely believed to cost a great deal to advanced industrial 
economies.  According  to  estimates  from  the  British  employer’s  organisation,  the  CBI, and  the 
professional organisation for Human Resource Management in Britain, the CIPD, sickness absence 
from work costs the British economy annually between £13.4bn and £16.5bn
1. A similar picture 
was  painted  by  the  British  government’s  Black  review  of  the  health  of  Britain's  working  age 
population, which put the wider economic costs of ill-health in Britain at over £100bn a year. Like 
the CBI and the CIPD, her review stressed the role of the workplace in the nation’s health, and that 
in addition to medical services, line managers have an essential part to play. The report stressed the 
mutual gains from employer action on employee sickness. ‘Good line management can lead to good 
health, well-being and improved performance. Line managers also have a role in identifying and 
supporting people with health conditions to help them to carry on with their responsibilities, or 
adjust responsibilities where necessary’ (Black, 2008 p11). 
  In  this  paper,  we  use  a  new  data  set  which  includes  monthly  observations  on  sickness 
absence,  performance  and  yearly  information  on  workforce  composition  and  well-being  for  48 
depots of a major UK company, PFW, which operates in the logistics sector, for the period 2004-
2008.    The  novelty  of  this  dataset  is  that  it  includes  detailed  information  on  four  different 
dimensions of workplace performance i.e. physical productivity, efficiency, quality of the service 
provided and profitability. Our data set also includes information from the organisation’s annual 
employee attitude survey over the period. This provides insight into employee views about their 
work, their managers, the company, and the plant level communication and consultation process. 
Over the period, the company invested a great deal of time and resources in improved absence 
management, by a mixture of health and well-being policies and better monitoring by local level 
managers who were encouraged to ‘manage not medicalise’ sickness absence. The CIPD and CBI 
surveys show that very few organisations undertake any rigorous measurement of their absence 
costs, and even when they do, they tend to adopt an accounting approach without measuring the 
impact  on  productivity  and  profitability.  We  were  also  able  to  conduct  a  number  of  in-depth 
interviews with local depot managers and local union representatives as well as senior managers of 
the organisation. These interviews helped us to gain some insight on the transmission mechanism 
between employees' well being, sickness absence and workplace performance within PFW (see 
Appendices 2 and 3 for details).  
                                                
1  Based on evidence from the Confederation of British Industry the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development, respectively, respectively Britain’s leading employer and human resource management organisations 
(CBI 2008, CIPD 2007) 2 
  Our analysis of detailed performance data from a single multi-site organisation sheds new 
light  on  the  effects  of  sickness  absence  on  organisational  performance,  and  is  a  step  forward 
compared with previous work based on large national labour force and production data sets: In the 
first part of the present paper we address the question whether improved absence management is 
associated  with  a  reduction  of  workplace  absence.  In  particular,  we  analyse  some  of  the 
determinants of depot sickness absence rates, and the relationship with employee well-being and 
local management effectiveness. In the second part we examine whether lower workplace absence 
has an effect on firms performance. We look at the effects of absence upon depot productivity, 
efficiency,  profitability  and  the  quality  of  the  service  delivered.  Our  results  show  that  good 
consultation  and  communication  at  the  local  level,  and  a  supportive  approach  to  absence 
management that emphasises employee well-being is associated with lower absenteeism. We also 
find that lower absence is associated with higher efficiency, productivity, quality of the service 
provided and profitability of the firm. Finally, we suggest that direct channels exist linking workers’ 
absence to firms’ profitability through the increased use of replacement labour and the reduction of 
the quality of service provided. 
  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  review  the  literature  on  the 
determinants of sickness absence and workplace performance. In section 3 we briefly describe the 
institutional characteristics of PFW and how we constructed our dataset. Section 4 provides the 
empirical analysis. In section 5 we highlight possible channels through which well-being policies 
affect workplace performance by means of a path analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Some previous research on sickness absence 
2.1  The causes and treatment of absence 
There is now a substantial body of research indicating that the kind of policies used by PFW to 
improve  employee  health  and  promote  more  healthy  life-styles  are  potentially  beneficial  to 
organisations. Two wide-ranging literature reviews stressed a number of fairly robust conclusions 
(see Luz and Green, 1997, and Harrison and Martocchio 1998). Some aspects of people’s life-styles 
are  particularly  associated  with  higher  absence  rates,  including  smoking,  heavy  drinking,  drug 
abuse, and lack of exercise. Physiological characteristics such as age are also influential. Harrison 
and Martocchio’s review (1998) shows that among men, absence rates tend to decline with age, but 
for  women,  there  is  no  relationship.  They  hypothesised  that  this  was  less  connected  with 
physiological age than with older workers having achieved a better fit between their job preferences 
and their current jobs, and hence to greater satisfaction.  
  The scope for management policies to reduce absence is also highlighted by the evidence 3 
that adapting work schedules can assist in promoting more reliable work attendance. According to 
the evidence reviewed by Harrison and Martocchio, working on day shifts, having flexible work-
schedules  and  shift  patterns  that  fit  with  social  routines  outside  work  also  contribute  to  lower 
absence.  Outside  caring  responsibilities  have  been  shown  to  be  a  major  influence  on  work 
attendance. On the one hand, people with such responsibilities may also have a more responsible 
attitude to their work, but on the other, such attitudes may from time to time be overridden by the 
needs of their dependents Other research also illustrates the importance of non-work demands on 
work  attendance  (eg. Allen 1996).  Action  to  improve  a  number  of  job-related  issues  is  also 
associated with lower absence (Harrison and Martocchio, 1998). According to these authors these 
include high levels of job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational commitment, doing 
meaningful tasks, and working in a group or a culture with strict and salient attendance norms. How 
the workplace is managed can also be influential. The usefulness of return-to-work interviews to 
reduce absence is widely supported by research evidence and managers’ experience (Krause et al., 
1998, and Crail, 2007), although there is variance between groups of employees, and much also 
depends on how managers carry them out. Likewise, the attempt to develop a more consultative, 
informative and supportive approach by local management accords with findings that this approach 
is associated with improved job satisfaction and contentment, which other studies have found to be 
related to lower absence (Deery et al., 1995, and Wood 2008). 
  Incentives  and  sanctions  may  also  reduce  absence  and  encourage  attendance.  Several 
psychologists and labour economists have used choice and utility maximisation models with some 
success, treating the work attendance decision as the outcome of a balance of positive and negative 
utilities (Harrison and Martocchio 1998, Barmby and Suzyrman, 2004). Within this framework, 
financial rewards for attendance, such as attendance bonuses, and experience-rated supplementary 
sick pay should raise the relative cost of absence for the employee, and so tip the balance in favour 
of attendance. Some studies suggest this is particularly relevant for the duration as opposed to the 
incidence of absence (Barmby et al 1991, Winkelmann, 1999). 
  Organisational factors can also be important, and perhaps the three most salient themes in 
the  literature  concern  the  effect  of  major  organisational  changes,  the  cost  of  absence  to  the 
organisation,  which  may  vary  according  to  its  technology,  and  what  might  be  called  the 
organisation’s ‘absence culture’. Major organisational changes, such as restructuring at PFW, have 
been found to affect attendance, although the theoretical approaches lead to differing conclusions. 
According to one, mainly psychological, line of research employees use temporary withdrawal as a 
means of coping with the stressful events, such as downsizing and increased job insecurity (eg de 
Witte 1999). On the other hand, many labour economists would expect a period of downsizing to be 
associated  with  reduced  absenteeism  because  employees  with  a  reputation  for  absenteeism  are 4 
likely to be higher on their employer’s list of those to be made redundant. In effect, such periods 
increase the expected cost of absence to the employee thereby inducing them to choose increased 
work attendance (Allen 1981, Dionne and Dostie 2007). 
  An organisation’s technology can affect its ability to accommodate absence without harming 
overall  performance.  For  example,  absence  is  more  costly  for  organisations  with  ‘just-in-time’ 
technologies  than  for  more  traditional  bureaucratic  models  which  use  buffer  stocks  to  ease 
adjustments.  According  to  their  situation,  firms  may  seek  to  recruit  employees  with  different 
propensities for absence by the design of their pay and benefit packages. For example, they might 
offer  higher  pay  coupled  with  a  strict  regime  on  attendance,  or  lower  pay  with  a  more 
accommodating regime. This approach has been investigated, for example, by Allen (1983) and 
Lanfranchi and Treble (2008). It could be argued that the organisation in this case study has made 
just this transition, as just-in-time delivery has become a key part of competition for internet sales. 
This approach also has implications for the distribution of absence costs between employer and 
employee as part of the cost of the more accommodating benefit package is paid for by employees 
taking lower wages. 
  Many writers have argued that organisations develop ‘cultures’, or standards, of attendance 
and with a set of legitimate or tolerated reasons for absence. In their classic studies, Hill and Trist 
(1953 and 1955) show how such norms of mutually acceptable absence behaviour are learned by 
new employees as they observe both how management treats their own absences, and how it treats 
those  of their  colleagues  during  their  first  years  in  an  organisation.  Four  to  five  years  service 
appeared to be the relevant threshold in their study. Although there may be formal rules about 
absence, what matters is how management applies them in practice. Management’s treatment of 
each case is likely to establish precedents in the eyes of other employees so that workplace norms of 
absence can evolve over time as part of a process of ‘custom and practice’ in the same way that 
other work standards evolve as a form of implicit negotiation as management errors of commission 
and omission are taken to establish new precedents (Brown 1973, Edwards and Scullion 1982). A 
number of studies have also provided evidence for the effects of work group cultures on absence, 
for example, work group cohesion can have positive or negative effects on absence depending on 
job satisfaction (Drago and Wooden 1992), and absence rates have been found to increase among 
teachers when they move to high absence schools (eg Bradley et al 2007). Aspects of the ‘absence 
culture’ thinking can be found in theories of the ‘psychological contract’ which stress the role of 
employee expectations about the ‘psychological contract’ governing what are mutually acceptable 
patterns of absence behaviour at work (Nicholson and Johns 1985). Management can influence such 
norms and expectations among its employees, but it cannot change them unilaterally (Conway and 
Briner, 2005). 5 
  Thus, the research literature strongly supports the contention that ‘sickness absence’ has 
many potential causes, not just strictly medical ones. From a policy point of view, this suggests that 
organisations have to apply  a range of different types  of policies. Promoting better  health and 
fitness can address some purely medical causes, but dealing with absence cultures or renegotiating 
psychological contracts clearly involves a rather different kind of approach. It is also likely that the 
approach  to  one  aspect of  absence  will  interact  with  the  others.  For  example, an emphasis  on 
improving  health  may  also  signal  to  employees  that  their  employers  wish  to  change  the 
psychological  contract.  Equally,  it  may  be  hard  for  an  employer  to  change  the  psychological 
contract without emphasising the value of employee health. It may also be hard to change it without 
simultaneously adopting other measures to treat absence such as improved record-keeping and an 
active management approach to return-to-work interviews. 
2.2  The effects and costs of absence 
There is a long tradition of estimating the cost of absence. It ranges from what might be called the 
‘book’ or ‘accounting’ cost, which computes the cost of a day’s absence by adding up the cost of 
such items as pay, benefits, management time and replacement labour, and the ‘behavioural’ cost. 
The  latter  seeks  to  estimate  the  cost  by  taking  into  account  behavioural  relations  within  the 
organisation and in the labour market, such as those affecting productivity and the incidence of 
costs on different parties. The former generally uses information from surveys of absence, often 
carried out by management or employer organisations, such as those of the CIPD and the CBI and 
their sister organisations in other countries, and apply an estimate of the cost of a day’s absence 
(e.g. Shelly, 1993). Examples of gross costs include wages and employer contributions of absent 
workers, replacement labour, management costs, and additional spill-over costs on other workers. 
Net costs would take account of the gross costs minus the productivity of the replacement labour, 
which  may  be  lower  than  that  of  the  person  absent.  Indeed,  as  will  be  seen  in  this  study, 
replacement labour was believed by managers, and appeared in the statistical analysis, to be only 
about half as productive as regular employees. Although useful to get an idea of the overall lost 
production due  to absence, these calculations  generally make the strong assumption that  100% 
attendance is a realistic standard by which to judge these losses. This could be moderated if those 
present  but  sick  have  reduced  productivity,  and  it  is  also  questionable  whether  a  zero  percent 
absence rate would be sustainable over time, and therefore an appropriate benchmark for estimating 
costs  (Caverley  et  al,  2006).  Being  present  but  at  reduced  productivity  because  of  illness, 
‘presenteeism’,  is  particular  common  for  mental  illness  which  affects  large  numbers  of  adults 
(Parsonage, 2007). Finally, although commonly reported as though absence is ‘costing business’ £x 
million pounds, this approach in fact gives no indication as to its division between employers in lost 6 
production and employees in lower wages or in extra work to cover for absent colleagues. 
  An alternative approach used by some labour economists has been to use market valuations. 
Allen (1983), for example, outlines two approaches to measuring the cost of employee absences 
from work: one based on wages and the other on productivity. The idea behind the first is that firms 
for which  absence costs are high will  be willing  to offer higher wages combined  with stricter 
absence provisions, and those for which absence matters less can be more tolerant, but pay lower 
wages. In effect, the wage offered reflects the productivity that the employer expects to achieve. 
Allen then estimates wage equations for US industries, and finds that industries with higher absence 
rates pay similar workers lower wages (that is, similar in terms of such characteristics as gender, 
household size, age, job tenure, education and occupation). He found that a 10% point rise in the 
absence rate was associated with a 1.3% decrease in the wage overall, and 2.4% for production 
workers. This is evidence that some of the cost of absence is shared by employees. 
  His  second  approach  reflects  the  idea  that  higher  absence  rates  damage  organisational 
performance, in this case, productivity. Using a standard production function model which links 
labour and capital inputs to outputs, he found that the same ten point increase in absence was 
associated with a 3.1% decline in industry productivity, which fell to 1.6% when controlling for 
industry-specific effects. Compared with the 1.3% decrease in overall wages above, this suggests 
that  a  substantial  part  of  the  overall  cost  of  absence  is  shared  with  employees.  Both  sets  of 
estimations used cross-sectional industry data for the US, and it could be argued that the real cost 
for business lies in the opportunity cost of absence, that is, the production plans that could not be 
achieved because of unreliable attendance levels. 
  Coles and Treble (1996), and Coles et al (2007) make a first step in this direction when 
exploring  the  implications  of  absence  for  different  production  technologies.  What  they  call 
‘assembly line’ technology requires a full complement of workers without which it cannot function. 
As a result, firms with this model have to hire additional workers to ensure absences are covered, 
which  reduces  average  worker  productivity.  In  contrast,  what  they  call  ‘linear’  production 
technologies make less stringent demands on attendance because output varies (linearly) according 
to the number of workers present. Most organisations lie in between these two extremes, but they 
serve to highlight how firms’ technology can affect the economic cost of absence they face. In a 
more recent paper, Lanfranchi and Treble (2008) take this further by looking at use of buffers in 
order to make ‘assembly line’ technologies more robust to absence, but these also entail costs, as 
highlighted by the literature on ‘lean production’. The present study takes this a step further by 
exploring  the  detailed  impact  of  absence  on  various  dimensions  of  organisational  performance 
across different sites. 
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3. The organisation and its data 
3.1  The organisation and its context 
The company, PFW, runs a major logistics operation across the UK working with a system of 
national sorting centres and about 50 local depots which collect and deliver items to businesses and 
to homes. A large part of the workforce is engaged in collection, sorting and delivery. The sector 
has become much more competitive in recent years as a result of postal deregulation across the EU, 
and the growth of internet sales. The parent company is strongly unionised and parts of it have long 
a tradition of robust industrial relations. 
  Between  2002  and  2004  PFW  underwent  a  major  transformation,  staunching  its  severe 
financial losses, and rescaling and restructuring its operations towards a smaller number of higher 
value-added delivery services. By 2004, the beginning of the period of observation, it had cut its 
workforce by two-thirds, and closed over half of its local depots, and by 2005-06, it returned a 
modest,  but  rising,  profit.  In  the  process,  it  moved  towards  greatly  improved  financial  health, 
establishing a platform from which it could compete in the increasingly deregulated market for 
delivery services. 
  However, the move towards greater efficiency and better financial health achieved by the 
end of its ‘Project Apollo’ was believed to lack sustainability because employee morale was low, 
and sickness absence rates were very high, the figure for the whole company being around 7% 
through much of 2004. At the time, the CBI and CIPD employer surveys of absence were reporting 
absence rates nationally of about 3-4%. 
 
3.2  The data 
Working  closely  with  the  organisation,  we  were  able  to  construct  a  panel  data  set  comprising 
monthly series for each depot on sickness absence rates, replacement labour, physical productivity, 
unit costs, a measure of profitability, and delivery quality of service. The company provided also 
information by depot from its annual employee attitude ‘Have Your Say’ (HYS) survey. This gave 
us information on employees’ views related to their jobs, their managers, the company as a whole, 
and the effectiveness of the local communication and consultation procedures ‘work time listening 
and  learning’,  WTL.  We  were  also  given  annual  figures  on  the  composition  of  each  depot’s 
workforce, notably its gender, age and length of service mix. Additional information on the state of 
depots’ local labour markets, local unemployment rates and local median pay, has been added in 
using  data  from  the  Office  for  National  Statistics  (ONS)  on  employee  earnings  and  local 
unemployment rates. The earnings data are for the year, and the unemployment data are monthly. 8 
The ONS monthly index of national non-store retail sales, a large part of which relates to online 
sales,  is  used  as  a  proxy  measure  for  the  level  of  demand  for  the  sector’s  delivery  services 
(Appendix Table A1 includes the complete list of our variables of interest with their means and 
standard deviations). 
  Absence rates are based on the total hours of reported sickness absence in depots for the 
period divided by the total number of contracted hours adjusted for holiday entitlements (SICK). 
Replacement labour is provided in the form of monthly numbers of agency workers used by the 
depot  (AGENCY).  Productivity  is  measured  in  daily  items  delivered  per  full  time  equivalent 
employee (ITEMS). Unit costs comprise direct employment and operating costs (UC). Profitability 
is measured by operating net income which relates to revenue earned from the depot’s collection 
and delivery operations, minus direct and indirect costs (PROF).
2 Quality of service relates to the 
percentage of items delivered on time (QS). The measures underlying these indicators are used as 
part of the organisation’s management accounting system and provide the basis for the performance 
targets set periodically for each depot. Targets are agreed between central and local management 
and  revised  to  take  account  of  changing  local  circumstances.  They  are  used  very  much  as  a 
discipline for local managers who would be called to account if targets were missed, and whose 
bonuses contained an element related to their targets. They also have the distinct methodological 
advantage to factor out a number of influences on local performance that were recognised by central 
and local management but which could not be measured statistically. As we see later in detail, we 
use the gap between the actual values and their target values as our main performance measures. 
Where appropriate, all the indicators were normalised on a daily basis because of variation in the 
number of working days in calendar months. 
  The HYS survey of employees’ attitudes is our source of indicators of employee opinions 
about their jobs, their managers, their company, the consultation process and social facilities at 
work, and has a response rate of 60-70% during the period of observation. The survey is carried out 
annually on a rotating basis across depots during the year. For our purposes, it comprises about 50 
questions, most of which ask respondents to give their opinions on Likert scales. Our measures of 
employees’ opinions on these issues were made available to us in aggregated form at depot level, 
and we ran a factor analysis to condense the replies into five indexes relating to employees views 
about their job, their manager, the company, its social facilities, and the quality of the weekly work-
time listening and learning sessions. The “My job” index includes such questions as the quality of 
team relations, whether employees have the necessary skills, shared responsibility for safety and 
helping  out  and  indicates  how  happy  workers  are  about  their  jobs.  The  “My  manager”  index 
                                                
2  Total revenue in this case excludes revenue paid centrally for certain major national contracts, and which is not 
attributed to individual depots. On the other hand, locally generated business is included in depot revenue. 
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includes such questions as fair treatment, influence on decisions, support from and approachability 
of management, management care about health and well-being and expresses workers' judgement 
about the quality of relations with their line managers and whether they feel they are supportive.  
The  “My company”  index includes  such questions  as communication of information about the 
company, organisational changes, and the bonus system, confidence in management’s leadership 
and  its  honesty;  it  reflects  views  about  the  perceived  quality  and  trustworthiness  of  senor 
management. The “WTL” index measures the frequency of WTL sessions attended, improvements 
made as a result of issues raised in WTL and HYS, use of local budget to fix problems, and if well-
informed  about  depot  performance.  It  provides  a  judgement  about  the  experiences  with 
management communication and consultation. Finally the “Social” index measures whether social 
facilities are good within the workplace. 
  For our analysis, we focus primarily on the financial years of 2005 and 2006. We have some 
data  for  2004  and  earlier,  but  were  advised  that  its  quality  was  not  as  good.  As  part  of  the 
company’s restructuring, it had sought to build a more effective statistical system with comparable 
data for each depot so that it could benchmark performance. It is also likely that the treatment of 
long-term and short-term absence changed during 2004.
3 This causes a break in the series at the end 
of 2004-05, but should not greatly affect month-to-month variability on either side of this date. We 
therefore use the earlier data mainly as a check on the robustness of our estimations for 2005-06 and 
2006-07. We also limit the analysis to observations where the monthly sickness absence rate is 
below 25%. This leaves us with over 950 observations for about 45 depots in the two-year period. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics 
4.1  Did  employees  benefit  from  the  absence  and  well-being  policies?  Trends  in  sickness 
absence in the company 2003-2008 and evolution of HYS scores over time 
Chart 1 shows the trend in sickness absence at PFW from the April 2003 up to March 2008 (pfw 
abs). The upper thick line traces the fall in absence rates, and shows that rates fell from around 6.5-
7%  in  2003  and  2004,  through  5%  in  2005  and  touching  4%  in  2006.  Thereafter  they  have 
fluctuated around 4-5% and appear to have levelled off at around 4.5% through 2007-08. It is 
interesting to note that a similar trend is registered for the usage of agency workers by PFW. This in 
fact decreases on average between 2004 and 2007 (Appendix Chart A1). Because sickness absence 
has a strong seasonal element, and can be affected by national sickness and economic factors, we 
                                                
3  Before then, most depots had counted only paid periods of sick absence. Employees on long-term sick leave 
for six to twelve months would have been on half pay, the rest coming from the sick pay fund, and so would have 
counted as half an absence. Those absent for twelve months or more would have been paid entirely from the sick pay 
fund, and have disappeared from the absence figures. 10 
show also monthly figures for sickness absence from the Labour Force Survey (lfs abs wt). The 
concepts are not  directly  comparable  in a way that  affects levels but not trends, (see the note 
beneath Chart 1). We also regressed the organisation’s absence rate on the national figure using 
year  and  month  dummies  to  capture  time  and  seasonal  effects.  The  predicted  absence  figure 
(pfwabs_pred) and the residuals (pfwabs_res) are also shown. The coefficients on the year dummies 
show an improvement by 2007 of about two and half points on the 2003 figure. 
    As mentioned earlier, the period of our study saw a major effort by the company to improve 
its absence management in order to reduce its high absence rates. Chart 2 shows the same PFW 
absence rates, but with the timing of major attendance and well-being policies superimposed. The 
thick red lines show the start of major policy initiatives such as the launch of the ‘Absence to 
Attendance’ programme in autumn 2004, which focused on reinvigorating the one-to-one return-to-
work interviews across the whole organisation and revitalising sickness reporting. The thin black 
lines represent the start of other, important but less far-reaching, policies. As can be seen, the major 
policy initiatives appear at times of significantly higher levels of absence, and are followed by a 
noticeable decline, suggesting an initial impact as they are rolled out, but also the need to keep up 
the pressure on attendance once they are in place. The smaller-scale policies appear fairly regularly 
over time, but there is a notable cluster of measures between the autumn of 2006 and early 2007 as 
absence levels appeared to rise again, before settling down again in 2007-08.   
  Although it would be analytically tidy to draw a sharp distinction between policies aimed at 
employee health and well-being and those aimed at improved attendance management, in practice, 
the depot managers we interviewed saw them as complements to each other. They stressed that 
work-related  issues,  such  as  harassment,  difficult  work  schedules,  and  conflict  with  domestic 
pressures, which may both contribute to poor health and attendance, could often be addressed by 
relatively small adjustments by either party. To take the appropriate actions, local management 
needs the knowledge, and this is best obtained, in their view, through the return-to-work interviews 
and job level consultation and communication. The company’s health and well-being programmes 
provided resources local management could draw upon to address issues raised in the return-to-
work interviews. Thus, the same channels that might be associated with closer absence monitoring, 




Table  1  presents  aggregate  figures  drawn  from  the  key  questions  contained  in  the  HYS 
questionnaire which relate to employees' well being within the workplace in the three years for 
which we have complete surveys. Given the good response rates, 60-70%, one can treat the results 
as fairly representative. Although the data available to us relate only to responses aggregated by 
depot, it is possible to assess how far overall attitudes to the company and its management are 
positive or negative. The overall results show that 68-75% of employees felt positively about their 
jobs, and broadly similar percentages were proud to work for the company, and wanted to continue 
working for it. Likewise, views were similarly positive about feeling fairly treated and enjoying 
work with their team. The one weak response in the table related to feeling valued by the company, 
which is comparatively lower than the others.  
  The operations managers interviewed stressed the importance of the blend of stick and carrot 
in the organisation’s absence and well-being policies. It is hard to judge precisely which is the more 
important, and therefore how far improved attendance was due to improved absence monitoring and 
how  far  it  was  due  to  employee  well-being  including  improved  dialogue,  mutual  support  and 
understanding within the workplace. If employees felt management was relying on the ‘big stick’, 
increased monitoring and discipline, then it is likely that attitudes would be negative. If on the other 
hand, they felt that management was approaching the question fairly, and adopting a supportive 
attitude, as described by some of the depot managers interviewed, then one would expect attitudes 
to be more positive. It is interesting to note in Table 1 that the share of affirmative answers to the 
key  questions  increases  over  time  of  percentages  that  range  between  6  and  10  points.  This 
observation suggests that employees well-being increased over time within the workplace and gives 
some ground to the latter interpretation i.e. the view that organisation's policies have worked more 
by improving employees' well-being rather than increasing monitoring within the workplace.
4 
 
  4.2  Depot sickness absence and performance variables 
Our analysis of sickness absence uses variations in absence rates between depots over time. Several 
studies of  sickness absence observed that absence rates appeared to  vary  significantly  between 
workplaces. A notable feature of the reduction in absence rates at PFW has been the improvement 
among the ‘worst performers’, as shown in Chart 3, which plots depot absence rates over time by 






                                    
4   Because the results also feed into local managers’ performance criteria, one could imagine that discontented 
employees would be motivated to respond rather than be apathetic, although we have no direct evidence on this. 12 
deciles  (similar  trends  are  experienced  by  workplace  performance  indicators;  see  Appendix 
Chart A2). 
       Another notable feature is that when depots experience high rates of sickness absence, they often 
last for several months. In other words, depot absence rates often do not reflect the random impact 
of short-term epidemics, but rather, something more systemic in the workplace environment. The 
same is true of the other performance variables we use in this study. Chart 4 shows the month-on-
month correlations between depot sickness rates, and although these decline over time, it is clear 
that if a depot has a high rate in month 1, the trace of this does not disappear until four or five 
months later. Other performance variables show a similar slow rate of convergence towards the 
mean. Of these, the ability to deliver on time (quality of service), and profitability seem to show the 
most stable rank orders between depots.  An analysis of the correlation coefficients between our 
variables of interest reveals a negative correlation of sick absence with productivity (-0,08), quality 
of service (-0,16) and profitability (-0,08) and a positive correlation of sick absence with unit costs 
(0,05; the full correlation matrix is in Appendix Table A2). 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1  Empirical strategy 
In line with our motivation, our empirical strategy is two fold. We first analyse the effect of absence 
management and well being policies on sick absence; after that, we investigate the role of absence 
as a determinant of organisational performance. 
We start by estimating the following model: 
 
SICKjmy=βjy Xjy +Z
’γ + αj + δm+ δy +uimy;          (1) 
 
Here Xjy are the indicators for employee well being within the firm j in year y, Z is a vector of 
controls for labour and product market outcomes (local unemployment rate, median income, index 
of non store sales in the depot's district). αj, are depot dummies while δm and δy are time dummies 13 
(for month and year, respectively). We run equation (1) by simple OLS.
5 
  The next step of our analysis is to explore the effects of sickness absence on organisational 




’λ+ αj + δm+ δy +vimy,         (2) 
 
where Yjmy is our indicator of performance (i.e. Y= ITEMS, UC, QS, PROF) in depot j, year y and 
month m. We start by estimating equation (2) using as a dependent variable the actual values of Y. 
These  estimates  however  are  likely  to  be  biased  due  to  the  fact  that  observed  value  of  each 
performance indicator also depends on the target values of the variable itself which are set by the 
management on the basis of the characteristics of the depot and the time period. Because of the way 
these targets are set, they take account of a number of important factors not measured in our data. 
To control for this we also estimate equation (2) using as dependent variables our performance 
indicators in their deviation from target values.
6 
  Finally, we refine the model by integrating the use of replacement labour. In a market that is 
increasingly  dominated  by  timed-delivery,  an  organisation  needs  agency  workers  to  meet  its 
obligations if it is short-staffed owing to sickness absence. One could expect the use of replacement 
labour to be both less effective and more costly than regular employees.
7 On the other hand, agency 
staff do not have to be employed when there is no work for them. 
  To  take  account  of  the  intervening  effect  of  agency  use  between  sickness  absence  and 




’φ + αj + δm+ δy +νimy;       (3) 
AGENCYjmy=χjmy SICKjmy +X
’ψ+Z
’κ + αj + δm+ δy +ζimy;       (4) 
 
                                                
5  In Appendix 2 we investigate further the relation between workers well-being and absenteeism by describing 
the possible determinants of well being within the workplace which emerged by the interviews with the operations 
managers and hypothesizing some transmission mechanism to absence.
 
6    These targets are set and regularly adjusted in consultation between the central management of PFW and the 
local depots' management. They are intended to take account of factors affecting performance that are outside local 
management control, such as location and the age of premises. Some of these depot specific factors could change over 
time, and so not be reflected in the fixed effects (e.g. major new investment or major changes in the state of local 
roads). Targets are also an important dimension of business performance in their own right as they play a key role in 
business  coordination.  Hence,  this  analysis  would  also  capture  the  disruptive  effect  of  variations  in  absence  on 
performance.  
7   This idea seems to be confirmed by the interviews we had with depot managers. Their general complaint was 
that agency staff were less effective than their regular employees as they often lacked detailed knowledge of delivery 
routes,  acquaintance  with  customers’ staff  which  could be especially  important for collections.  Managers seem  to 
consider  their regular drivers as the ‘eyes and the ears’ of his business, and important for building good relationships 
with customers. They would seldom use an agency driver for an important customer. Moreover notice that the use of 
agency staff was charged to depots at a rate about a fifth higher than the cost of pay and benefits for their regular 
employees. 14 
Where AGENCYjmy is the number of agency workers employed by depot j in year y and month m. 
As before,  Yjmy is our indicator of  performance. The system  composed  by (4) and (5) aims at 
investigating the existence of an indirect channel through which absence may affect organisational 
performance. We estimate it by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) thus allowing standard 
errors being correlated across specifications.
8 
 
5.2  Results 
 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of the relationship between sickness absence and five measures 
(factors) of employee views related to their well-being at work: their manager, their company, their 
jobs, workplace consultation, and workplace social facilities. In columns [1] to [5] we include each 
indicator of well being separately while in column [6] we introduce all the indicators in the same 
regression. All regressions also include a number of other variables relating to the state of the 
labour market (local unemployment and local median pay) and product demand (non-store sales) at 
the  district  level,  and  a  selection  of  workforce  characteristics  likely  to  capture  the  effects  of 
domestic pressures, and the employee’s integration into the workforce.  
  Employee perceptions of supportiveness of their managers, their company, and of workplace 
social facilities exert a weak or non-significant influence on depot absence rates (Table 2, columns 
[1], [2] and [5]). Good team-level consultation and communication with line managers is associated 
with lower absence levels (column [4]). It was suggested earlier that this is likely to be correlated 
with effective attendance management in depots (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed analysis of the 
relation between sickness absence and WTL based on a model derived from our interviews with the 
managers). Conversely, a favourable judgement about their jobs is positively related to absenteeism 
(column [3]). Although surprising at a first sight, this result may reflect how accommodating, and 
possibly indulgent, their managers are with regard to attendance.   
  Finally, all the estimates show that a higher local unemployment rate is associated with 
lower depot absence rates. This can to be interpreted as reduced local employment opportunities 
causing employees to value their current jobs more highly and so provide better attendance and 
higher effort. Conversely a higher local median pay improves the outside options for workers, thus 
being associated to higher absence. Non-store sales indicate the level of product demand in the 
sector, which puts pressure on workloads thus contributing to fatigue and absenteeism
9. Size and 
                                                
8   On the basis of the interviews we had with line managers within PFW, in Appendix 3 we develop a model 
which describes how the increased reliance on agency workers implied by sickness absence  reduces productivity and 
quality of service and, accordingly, firms efficiency and profitability. 
9   Several of the managers we interviewed recognised that the work was physically demanding, and people got 
tired and were likely to fall sick after periods of prolonged overtime working. 15 
significance of the coefficients is not altered when we add all the indicators in the same regression 
(column [6]). 
         In Table 3, we report the results from the estimates of equation (2) on the actual level of ITEMS, 
UC, QS and PROF.  SICK shows a negative impact on ITEMS and QS which is significant at the 
5% level (Table 3, columns [1] and [3]). The coefficients for the impact of SICK on UC and PROF 
also take the expected signs but are not significant (columns [2] and [4]. Notice also that employees' 
well being does not seem to exert any significant positive impact on workplace performance once 
we account directly for the impact of sick absence. 
         As explained before, however, estimates reported in Table 3 may be biased as  the target values set 
by the management for each indicator change across depots and over time. To correct this bias, we 
estimate equation (2) on our performance indicators taken as variances of the actual values from 
their target. Table 4 reports the results. Compared to the estimates on actual values, the impact of 
absence on performance indicators is now more significant (always between 1% and 5%): a one 
percentage point rise in a depot’s sickness absence is associated with an additional shortfall on the 
productivity target of -0.15 items delivered per person per day, and it pushes unit costs an additional 
£0.01 over cost targets per item delivered. It moreover reduces of the 0,7% the percentage of items 
delivered on time and of around £2 per day the net income produced on average by each depot.  
        We suggested before that sick absence may also indirectly affect organisational performance via the 
implied use of replacement labour. Table 5 presents the results of four sets of estimates from the 
system composed by equations (3) and (4) above on ITEMS, UC, QS, and PROF. We estimate each 
set by “Seemingly Unrelated Regressions” to allow the standard errors to be correlated across the 
two equations in the system. These estimates give some support to our theoretical priors: variations 
in sickness absence have a direct impact on the use of replacement labour, a one point rise in 
sickness absence leading to an increase of 1.3 agency workers which is significant at the 1% on all 16 
our  indicators  of  performance.
10  The  increased  agency  use  has  the  anticipated  effect  on 
performance:  raising  unit  costs,  and  reducing  productivity,  quality  of  service  and  profitability. 
Coefficients are again significant at the 1%.
11 
         Before concluding, we provide a simple visual presentation of our empirical findings showing the 
channels through which management policies aimed at increasing workers' well being and reducing 
absence may lead to improved workplace performance. While it is clearly beyond the scope of the 
present paper to provide a comprehensive analysis of such mechanisms, in Chart 5 we use a simple 
path analysis
12 to sketch out a possible model for the impact of improved absence management and 
communication on business performance. This is based largely on our interviews with operations 
managers of PFW, but it also reflects a number of the points emerging from the regression analysis 
in  this  paper..  Path  coefficients  scale  each  variable  in  terms  of  its  standard  deviation.  This  is 
analogous to seeing whether the best performing depots in terms of WTL will have the lowest 
absence rates and the best quality of service. The chart expresses visually the same relationships 
noted  earlier,  for  example,  that  absence  rates  have  a  rather  weak  direct  effect  on  business 




This  paper  has  explored  the  potential  gains  for  one  organisation  that  derive  from  reducing 
absenteeism  by  improved  absence  management  supported  by  employee  health  and  well-being 
policies.  We  used  a  new  data  set  which  includes  monthly  observations  on  sickness  absence, 
workplace performance and yearly information on workforce composition and well-being for a 
company which operates in the logistics sector, for the period 2004-2008. Due to the level of detail 
of the data, we are able to look at four complementary dimensions of workplace performance i.e. its 











                                        
10  For an average-sized depot, a 1% point increase in the absence rate equates to an increase in 0.6 people absent, 
implying a replacement ratio of about two agency staff for one absent regular staff (1.3/0.6). Notice that this figure  
corresponds exactly to what the depot managers told us about the relative productivity of regular workers. 
11  In annual terms, across the  organisation’s  48  depots,  on these estimates, a  one point increase in sickness 
absence would translate roughly into a drop in productivity of 22k items delivered, increased costs of £207k, and a 
reduction of net income of about £300k. 
12   Path analysis expresses the relationships between the variables as standardised ‘path coefficients’ so one may 
compare the relationships between the different variables. Full details are provided in Appendix 2 17 
productivity, efficiency, the quality of the service provided and profitability. Our results show that 
good  consultation  and  communication  is  associated  with  lower  absence  and  higher  efficiency, 
productivity, quality of the service provided and profitability of the firm. We also suggested that an 
indirect channel exists which links workers’ absence to firms’ profitability through the increased 
use of replacement labour and the reduction of the quality of service provided. 
  The interpretation we want to give of our results is that the improved recording of absence 
and systematic one-to-one interviews and follow up of work absences has improved management’s 
‘procedural grip’ (to use the words of one central manager), on the problem. However, in the view 
of the PFW depot managers interviewed, this management of absence was facilitated by the give-
and-take facilitated by the well-being policies that supported it. We believe that the present analysis, 
due to the excellent data provided to us by the organisation, and the time that managers gave for the 
in-depth interviews, provides the basis for a significant step forward in the analysis of the effects of 
absence and absence policies on organisational performance. It has made it possible to adopt a 
behavioural rather than an accounting approach to estimating the adverse costs of sickness absence, 
and this is a significant advance on studies using national labour force and production data. The 
availability of the performance targets which are used by central and local management has made it 
possible to open up an new area for analysis: the effects of the inherent variability in absence on the 
coordination  of  activity  within  a  complex  business.  It  has  been  possible  to  examine,  albeit 
indirectly, the impact of local management quality and local implementation of the policies, and the 
availability of employee attitude information has made it possible to distinguish the ‘fear’ from the 
‘give-and-take’ approach. 
  Inevitably many questions remain. PFW is not a ‘representative firm’ and this affects how 
far one may generalise to other organisations. The importance of just-in-time delivery, although 
spreading across organisations, is not yet the general rule, and it may never be. The workforce is 
predominantly male at a time when women make up nearly half of the national workforce. On the 
other hand, the workforce in PFW is skilled but not highly educated, and so is rather like that in 
many other UK organisations. Moreover, their basic earnings are close to those of other drivers 
reported in the ONS annual statistics on hours and earnings. As the CIPD (2008) observed, when 
presenting its annual absence survey, such policies as those use by PFW are not rocket science, but 
a  blend  of  systematic  use  of  absence  procedures,  improved  communication  between  staff  and 
management, and supported by employee well-being policies. The same CIPD survey showed that a 
great many UK organisations do not have a systematic approach to employee attendance, so the 
potential to benefit from the PFW experience appears considerable.  
  The  main  limitation  of the  present analysis  is  the  lack  of  monthly  observations  for  the 
indicators of well-being (available only on yearly basis) and of individual information on workers' 18 
characteristics within the firm. It would be very interesting to collect such information (of course 
subject to availability) and investigate more in detail the individual determinants of absenteeism 
within the workplace and how these affect organisational performance. 
 
7. Main Text Tables 
Table 1. Employee judgements about their organisation 2004-2007. 
 
Q 
no  Question  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07 
      %  %  % 
2  I enjoy my job  68  75  75 
57  I am proud to work for my company  59  70  70 
49 
I would like to be working for my company in 12 months 
time  71  80  80 
56  I feel my company values me  36  43  43 
14  My line manager treats me fairly and with respect  65  72  73 
29  I enjoy working with my team  63  69  69 
 Unweighted average scores across depots.       19 
 
Table 2. OLS estimates of the relationship between sickness absence and measures of employee evaluations of their  
workplace, workforce characteristics and market pressures.     
 
Dependent variable – SICK 
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
                         
Good manager  -0.052                    0.063   
  [0,166]                    [0,175]   
Good Company      -0.31                -0.321   
      [0,202]                [0,248]   
Good job          0.414  ****          0.441  **** 
          [0,135]            [0,143]   
Good WTL              -0.493  ****      -0.390  ** 
              [0,182]        [0,194]   
Good Social facilities                  -0.179    0.049   
                  [0,161]    [0,188]   
Non-store sales  0.041  *  0.041  *  0.043  *  0.039    0.041  *  0.041  * 
  [0,024]    [0,024]    [0,024]    [0,024]    [0,024]    [0,024]   
Local unemployment %  -0.872  ****  -0.76  ****  -1.094  ****  -0.771  ****  -0.928  ****  -0.890  **** 
  [0,195]    [0,205]    [0,197]    [0,191]    [0,190]    [0,226]   
Median local pay   0.572    0.548    0.823  *  0.306    0.62    0.592   
  [0,484]    [0,483]    [0,488]    [0,491]    [0,485]    [0,501]   
Controls for workforce composition
1  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Depot dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year, month dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R2 (adj)  0.4017  0.4032  0.4078  0.4065  0.4025  0.45 
N  967  967  967  967  967  967 
 
Robust standard errors in squared brackets: **** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, prime age workers, part time workers,workers with  tenure less than 5 years. 
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Table 3. Impact of sickness absence on depot performance  
(OLS estimates on actual values of performance indicators: 2005/06 and 2006/07). 
 
                 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Dep variable  ITEMS  UC  QS  PROF 
                 
SICK  -0.11  **  0.009    -0.068  **  -0.601   
  [0,048]    [0,007]    [0,033]    [0,750]   
Good manager  -0.321    0.043  ***  -0.217    -1.035   
  [0,222]    [0,017]    [0,186]    [4,158]   
Good company  -0.001    -0.043    0.381    -1.071   
  [0,432]    [0,053]    [0,245]    [7,380]   
Good job  0.149    -0.012    0.015    1.323   
  [0,152]    [0,014]    [0,139]    [3,991]   
Good WTL  -0.134    0.057    -0.106    8.616   
  [0,365]    [0,051]    [0,201]    [6,590]   
Good social facilities  0.251    0    -0.404  **  -23.58  **** 
  [0,230]    [0,021]    [0,181]    [6,950]   
UK non-store sales  0.624  ****  -0.01    -0.204  ****  1.755  **** 
  [0,040]    [0,007]    [0,018]    [0,636]   
Median pay  -0.868  *  -0.001    -0.806  *  6.228   
  [0,491]    [0,089]    [0,406]    [11,917]   
Urate  -0.39    0.016    0.37    0.596   
  [0,255]    [0,030]    [0,226]    [5,327]   
Controls for workforce composition
1  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Depot dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year, month dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R2  0.8612  0.6691  0.9014  0.862 
N  952  960  949  955 
 
Clustered standard errors at the depot level in squared brackets 
**** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 21 
Table 4. Impact of sickness absence on depot performance  
(OLS estimates on gaps between actual and target outcomes: 2005/06 and 2006/07). 
 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Dep variable  ITEMS  UC  QS  PROF 
                 
SICK  -0.152  ***  0.01  **  -0.075  **  -1.658  **** 
  [0,061]    [0,005]    [0,036]    [0,548]   
Good manager  -0.879    0.05    -0.25    -24.709  **** 
  [0,703]    [0,032]    [0,206]    [4,261]   
Good company  0.277    -0.01    0.212    -2.134   
  [1,115]    [0,050]    [0,254]    [6,557]   
Good job  0.563    0.01    -0.123    8.241  ** 
  [0,758]    [0,028]    [0,159]    [3,698]   
Good WTL  0.319    -0.03    0.262    3.495   
  [0,838]    [0,043]    [0,235]    [4,926]   
Good social facilities  -0.699    0.05    -0.635  ****  2.241   
  [0,548]    [0,035]    [0,218]    [5,628]   
Median pay  0.464    -0.02    1.697  **  28.448  * 
  [2,213]    [0,143]    [0,759]    [15,516]   
Urate  0.747    -0.1  **  0.562  **  3.781   
  [0,818]    [0,046]    [0,245]    [8,630]   
Controls for workforce composition
1  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Depot dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year, month dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R2  0.5361  0.4514  0.8933  0.3343 
N  952  960  909  955 
Clustered standard errors at the depot level in squared brackets 
**** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 22 
Table 5. Sick absence, agency replacement labour and organisational performance (SURE estimates, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007). 
 
   [1]     [2]     [3]     [4] 
Dep var:  AGENCY  ITEMS     AGENCY  UC     AGENCY  QS     AGENCY  PROF 
                                       
AGENCY      -0  ****        0.005  ****        -0.042  ****        -0.347  **** 
      [0,006]          [0,001]          [0,004]          [0,089]   
Sick absence rate (%)  1.28  ****        1.333  ****        1.317  ****        1.326  ****     
  [0,221]          [0,221]          [0,224]          [0,222]       
‘My manager’  good  -2.29  *        -2.1          -2.19          -2.116       
  [1,303]          [1,308]          [1,356]          [1,309]       
‘My company’  good  2.89          2.269          2.269          2.614       
  [1,805]          [1,805]          [1,829]          [1,816]       
‘My job’  good  0.18          0.397          0.559          0.3       
  [1,033]          [1,037]          [1,056]          [1,038]       
‘WTL’  good  1.47          1.557          1.267          1.55       
  [1,394]          [1,397]          [1,460]          [1,401]       
‘Social facilities’ good  -1.1          -1.086          -1.06          -1.285       
  [1,488]          [1,495]          [1,535]          [1,495]       
UK non-store sales      0.64  ****        -0.017  ****        -0.14  ****        2.233  **** 
      [0,030]          [0,003]          [0,02]          [0,449]   
Local labour market conditions
1  Y  N     Y  N     Y  N     Y  N 
Controls for workforce  
composition
2  Y  N    Y  N    Y  N    Y  N 
Depot dummies  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Year, month dummies  Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y 
R2  0.859  0.581    0.578  0.68    0.577  0.905    0.576  0.852 
N  942  942     949  949     937  937     945  945 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets: **** <1%, *** <2%, **<5%, * <10%. 
1 local unemployment rate and local median pay 
2 include % of women, age and tenure composition, part time workers, temporary workers. 23   
 
Main Text Charts  
 
Chart 1. Sickness absence by monthly reporting period 2003-2008. 
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Note: The thick upper line shows the rate (%) of sickness absence at PFW based on hours of absence divided by 
total contracted hours, adjusted for annual leave entitlements. The lower thick purple line shows days’ absence in 
the past week for all employees from the national Labour Force Survey, based on self-reports by respondents. 
The difference of concept means that the levels are not comparable. The upper thin dashed line shows the rates 
of  PFW  absence  predicted  from  a  regression  analysis  including  time  and  depot  dummies  and  the  national 
absence figure. This removes the effect of any national level absence factors from the PFW figure. The lower 
thin line plots the regression residuals. The years shown are fiscal years from April to March. Sources: PFW and 
the British Labour Force Survey. 
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Note: absence rates (%) by depot. Rates of greater than 25% were excluded on the grounds of likely recording errors. 
With data for about 45 depots, the bottom 10% represent 4 depots. 
 
 












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


































new series  
26 
Chart 5: the relationship between improved absence management and WTL and improved 
profitability and unit costs (beta coefficients) 




All beta coefficients are significant at the 1% level, except agency use on productivity, significant at 














-0.23  +0.16  -0.05  +0.14 (UC: -0.33) 
-0.19  +0.13 (UC: -0.13)  
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8. Appendix Charts and Tables 
 
Table A1: Means and standard deviations of main variables (2005/06-2006/07): company’s items 
relate to monthly figures by depot. 
 
Variable description  Units  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
             
ITEMS  Items  delivered  per 
fte per day  954  40.27  7.13  18.97  70.38 
UC  Operational  costs 
per item delivered  962  3.13  0.55  -3.49  5.96 
QS  % of items delivered 
on time  951  94.72  5.38  63.10  99.28 
PROF  Net income per head 
per day  957  -19.14  103.45  -435.37  325.33 
SICK  %  996  4.75  2.94  0.00  24.09 
AGENCY  Headcount  955  23.15  22.04  0.00  154.70 




972  5.49  2.01  2.50  10.30 
Local median hourly 
pay 
£ 
972  9.53  1.29  7.71  13.69 
Index  of  non-store 
sales 
Base 100 
996  100.12  11.75  84.10  131.80 
             
Good manager  Factor score  996  -0.05  1.02  -3.26  1.92 
Good company  Factor score  996  0.34  0.83  -1.88  2.09 
Good job  Factor score  996  0.19  0.93  -5.47  1.83 
Good WTL  Factor score  996  -0.25  0.95  -2.62  1.82 
Good  social 
facilities 
Factor score 
996  -0.05  0.93  -2.24  3.51 
             
Female (%)    967  9.94  4.09  2.22  24.56 
Part-time (%)  %  991  8.51  4.26  0.00  19.68 
Permanent (%)  %  967  92.34  5.62  71.65  100.00 
             
% Aged 35-39  %  967  17.10  6.10  0.00  35.71 
% Aged 40-44  %  967  18.56  6.40  3.92  42.86 
% Aged 45-49  %  967  13.45  5.29  2.38  25.00 
% Aged 50-54  %  967  9.68  4.09  2.00  20.41 
% Aged 55-59  %  967  8.08  4.23  1.35  17.65 
% Aged 60-64  %  967  3.55  2.65  0.00  13.43 
% Aged >=65  %  967  0.44  1.02  0.00  4.76 
             
Length of service 0-
4 years (%) 
% 
967  26.68  12.69  3.80  56.78 




Table A2: sickness absence and workplace performance: correlation matrix 
 
           
  ITEMS  QS  SICK  PROF  UC 
ITEMS  1         
QS  0.07  1       
SICK  -0.08  -0.17  1     
PROF  0.45  0.49  -0.08  1   
UC  -0.64  -0.07  0.05  -0.34  1 
           





Table A3: WTL evaluation and sickness absence: SURE estimates 
 
           
   Good WTL  SICK   
Good WTL      -0.94  ****   
      [0,169]     
Non-store sales      0.038  *   
      [0,024]     
Median local pay      0.402     
      [0,464]     
% female  -0.21  ****  -0.117     
  [0,019]    [0,009]     
% permanent  3.753  **       
  [0,962]         
% age 35-44  0.05  ****       
  [0,01]         
Urate  0.166  ****       
  [0,035]         
Depot dummies  Y  Y   
Year, month dummies  Y  Y   
Observations  967  967   
R2 (adj)  0.808  0.432   




Table A4. Path analysis coefficients, standard errors and diagnostics 
 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  Beta 
Signif- 
icance   
Sick absence rate (%)               
‘WTL’  good  -624  0.16  -229  ****   
Local unemployment %  -755  0.188  -577  ****   
R2  0.318            
Agency use               
Sick absence rate (%)  1.351  0.219  0.161  ****   
UK non-store sales  1.381  0.16  0.736  ****   
R2  0.579            
Quality of service               
‘WTL’  good  0.339  0.124  0.06  ****   
Agency use  -46  0.004  -186  ****   
R2  0.901            
Productivity               
Agency use  -15  0.006  -47  ***   
UK non-store sales  0.647  0.031  1.063  ****   
R2  0.86            
Profitability               
Quality of service  2.437  0.766  0.127  ****   
Productivity  2.09  0.5  0.143  ****   
UK non-store sales  0.922  0.561  0.104  *   
R2  0.855            
n  930            
                
Unit labour costs               
Quality of service  -12  0.004  -128  ****   
Productivity  -23  0.003  -330  ****   
UK non-store sales  0.009  0.003  0.21  ****   
R2  0.811            
n  930            
 
Depot, year and month dummies used throughout; robust standard errors 
**** <1%, *** <2%, ** <5%, * <10%  
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Chart A1. Monthly average rates of sick absence and of agency use (measured on different scales) 
















Notes: Sick absence (%, upper line) mean multiplied by 5 to compare with agency usage (no of ftes, 
lower line).  
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Appendix Graph 2 shows the dispersion of the depot key performance indicators over time. Reading 
the panels left to right, the upper panels show productivity (items delivered per full-time equivalent) 
and  sickness  absence  (%),  and  the  lower  panels  show  quality  of  service  and  unit  costs.  The 
percentiles shown are p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90, and the mean. 
 
It is notable that quality of service varies seasonally with the number of items delivered per full-
time employee. Note also that the peaks in agency use follow the same seasonal pattern as parcels 
delivered and quality of service. This supports the view that the primary function of agency use is 
as a buffer to cope with varying customer demand, and that adaptation to absence uses the same 







9. Appendix 1: Use of HYS attitude data to assess implementation of policies at 
depot level  
 
Although  the  well-being  and  absence  policies  shown  in  Chart  2  were  company-wide  in  their 
application, our interviews with both central and local management made it clear that there was also 
a good deal of variation at depot level in terms of how quickly and how effectively they were 
implemented. Our strategy has been to use this variation in order to gauge the effects of local 
management  implementation.  Of  the  questions  asked  in  the  employee  surveys,  those  on  the 
operation of WTL best capture the quality of depot level implementation of the well-being and 
attendance policies. The questions asked for more factual information than many of the other survey 
questions relevant to this study, and provide a ‘view from below’ about the conduct of aspects of 
depot management. 
  The depot level information on WTL from these surveys, relates to employees’ participation 
in, and satisfaction with, the  weekly  team-level  consultation  and communication meetings, and 
whether management followed up and implemented issues that were raised there. In these meetings, 
typically, managers would have 10 minutes to raise their issues, and the team members, 10 minutes 
for theirs, with a further 10 minutes for joint matters. Participation by employees involves a cost on 
their part because they still have to get their jobs done, and in our interviews, depot managers told 
us that most common reason for not attending was that that their drivers just wanted to get out onto 
the road. Hence, their willingness to participate reflects their perception of WTL effectiveness, and 
their interest in discussing work-related issues with management. 
  How far can we judge that effective WTL is a good proxy for effective implementation of 
the absence and well-being policies? From our interviews with local managers, good WTL and 
good attendance management go hand in hand, and have a shared objective of improving workplace 
performance, and building on employee support. Both involve local management in committing 
some resources, in the first instance at team level, and in the second, at individual level. Both 
involve management seeking to improve employees’ understanding of the company’s needs, and 
understanding how their individual performance and attendance contributes to the overall picture. 
Indeed, there are good methodological reasons for its use. First, WTL covers most employees, 
including  those  who  might  potentially  take  absence  but  choose  not  to,  whereas  return-to-work 
interviews  affect  only  those  who  have  been  absent.  Second,  the  numbers  going  through  the 
interviews in some months, especially in smaller depots, could be too small for a reliable statistical 
analysis. 
  Thus our key assumption is that depots with good communication for WTL will also have 
good communication for the return-to-work interviews, and those that are good at finding resources 
to meet employee issues in WTL will also be good at developing solutions to improve attendance. It 
might be objected that we are not measuring the incidence of absence and well-being policies so 
much  as  variations  in  the  quality  of  local  management.  This  cannot  be  excluded.  However, 
improving attendance was one of the top priorities given to local management on the ground that it 
held the key to solving a number of the organisation’s performance problems. 
  In Table A3, we show the results of our SURE regressions of measures of local management 
on sickness absence. They comprise two elements: the first equation concerns the determinants of 
‘good WTL’, and the second, the influence of ‘good WTL’ on sickness absence. The variables 
included in the different steps merit some explanation. Concerning the determinants of good WTL, 
regular  participation  depends  partly  on  management  quality,  and  partly  on  employee  interest. 
Willman et al (2006) argue that employees with a greater stake in their jobs will be more likely to 
want to voice their concerns to management, and see the business prosper. That stake is proxied by  
33 
taking the percentage of employees in the depot aged 35-44, the percentage who are permanent 
employees, and the local rate of unemployment. At age 35-44, drivers would be experienced and 
have developed a good knowledge of their routes and customers, something fostered by greater 
stability in the workforce, and high local unemployment would signal a paucity of competing jobs 
where they could use their skills. This ‘asset specificity’, according to Willman et al (2006), would 
lead to a greater demand for involvement of the kind occurring within the weekly WTL sessions. 
Concerning the influences on sickness absence alongside WTL, non-store sales capture the pressure 
of work, local median pay, outside job opportunities, and the percentage of women, the degree of 
household pressures on work attendance. We also confirmed the robustness of these years’ data by 
extending the analysis to 2004/05. As can be seen in Table A3, good WTL is associated with lower 
rates of absence, and the effects are quite strong. Factor scores are measures in standard deviation 
units, with about 2/3 of all cases lying within one standard deviation unit of the mean, which in this 
case is zero. Thus, one could read the coefficients as follows: if a depot moves from the average 
score on WTL effectiveness to the score within the top 15% of depots, its absence rate would fall by 




10. Appendix 2: Path analysis of the impact of absence policies on net income 
and unit costs 
  Table A4 reports the detailed results of a “path analysis” shown in which suggests what the 
relative strengths of the different linkages may be in terms of standardised units based on their 
respective  standard  deviations.  All  coefficients  are  statistically  significant:  in  particular,  the 
coefficient of 1.3 for the impact of sickness on agency use in Table 5 becomes 0.16 in terms of the 
two variables’ relative standard deviations. The path analysis suggests that the impact of agency use 
may be more damaging to quality of service than to productivity (unit costs).
13  The impact of 
improved productivity is to raise profitability (+0.14), but by about half the amount that it reduces 
unit costs (-0.33). The impact through quality of service on profitability is almost equivalent to the 
one on unit costs (+0.13 vs -0.13) i.e. improved quality of service seems to be as effective at 
increasing firms profitability as at increasing its efficiency. 
  Finally, notice that the main purpose of the path analysis has been to provide an illustration 
of the statistical relationships behind the organisational model which emerged from the interviews 
with the line managers. Of course this does not preclude the influence of other mechanisms than 




                                                
13  This  may  reflect  difficulties  in  redistributing  work  when  agency  staff  are  used  because  of  their  lesser 
familiarity with the job, and the growing importance of timed deliveries. Thus although it may be possible to maintain 
the volume of collections and deliveries, and thus physical productivity, when agency staff are used, it is much harder to 
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